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BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
REHEARING
POINT I
THE PETITION SUBMITTED BY THE
APPELLANT IS SIMPLY A REARGUMENT OF THE SAME MATTER THAT
HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN PRESENTED
TO THE COURT.
Rule 76 (e) (1) says in part:
" ... the petition shall be
by a brief of the
authorities relied upon to
sustain the points listed
in the petition ... "

The Brief submitted by Appellant
contained not one single quoted case,statute,
rule or authoricy to support the position
of the Appellant.
Attorney for the Appellant on appeal
was not a part of the matter as it was tried
before the Trial Court and can therefore probably be excused for being ignorant of the
fact that the Trial Court Judge at pretrial of the matter, determined that as a
matter of law, the claim made by the
stock in question as a proported gift was
totally and completely inconsistent, and
mutually exclusive with the claim of a summary distribution.
Rulon J. Morgan, who
then represented the Appellant,was required
by the Court to elect either to make proof
that there had been a gift or to elect to
make proof that there had been a distribution, he elected the former and therefore the Court ruled that there could not
be any evidence received on the latter.
Our Supre1,1e Court has held that new
points first brought to the Supreme Court's
attention on appiication for rehearing,
thougL they were just as available on the
original hearing cannot be considered.
(See Harrison vs. Harker, 44 Utah 541,142
P. 716; Swanson vs. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170
P. 744; Dahlguish vs. Denver & Rio Grande
Company, 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833.)
The
same would apply to a point not decided by
the Trial Court and raised for the first
time on appeal.
Our Supreme Court has also held that
to justify a rehearing a strong case must

be made.
The Supreme Court must be convinced firmly that it either failed to
consider some material point in the case,
that it erred in its conclusions or that
some mact .. has been discovered which was
unknown at the time of the original hearing.
(See In Re McKnight, 4 Utah 237, P. 299;
Brown vs. Pickard, 4 utah 292, 9 P. 573,
11 P. 512.)
No rehearing will be granted where
nothing new and important is offered for
consideration.
(See Jones vs. House, 4
Utah 484, 11 P. 619; Cummings vs. Nielson,
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619.)
POINT II
THE APPEALS COURT WILL NOT
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR
THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT WHERE
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
Both Point I and Point II of the
Appellant's petition and brief have reference to factual determinations which were
made by the District Court.
In the opinion rendered by the
Supreme Court the majority decision correctly left to the finder of fact the ultimate determination of those factual issues.
(Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.
2 (d) 465.)
At the pretrial, the Judge and
attorneys mutually agreed that the only
issue to be determined was whether or not
a gift had been made by the deceased
-3-

Father to the Mother and then in turn from
the Mother to the Appellant. The question
of a distribution of the estate was not an
issue before the Court and was immaterial
and the Court so ruled it. The only evidence of a gift was from Appellant (which
was subsequently ruled out as barred by
the Dead Man's Statute) and from Lavon
Christensen, whose evidence was so patently
rehearsed and based on hearsay that the
trial judge did not believe any of it.
POINT III
ON APPEAL, THE EVIDENCE IS
TO BE CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
RESPONDENTS.
Inasmuch as the Trial Court found
in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Respondents herein, they are entitled to have a
review of the evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Respondents.
(Buehner Block Company vs.
Glezos, 6 Utah 2 (d) 266, 310 P. 2(d) 517;
Beck vs. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2{d} 127, 262 P.
2(d) 760.)
The evidence presented by the Respondents indicates that the stock in question,
which belonged to the deceased George
Hatton Buckley continued to be and remained
the property of his estate from the time of
his death until the present because it was
in fact, not disposed of thr ugh any
statutory or legal means.
-4-

All of the children of the two deceased persons agreed that although other
items of their parents personal belongings
were divided among them, that there was
never at any time any discussion concerning
the stock certificates or the ownership
thereof and they were certainly not part of
any informal distribution between the three
children of the two deceased parents. The
stock was fully within the control of George
Hatton Buckley from and after the purported
gift, and was after that time displayed by
George to his son Gerald (Trial Transcript
Page 188 and 189.)
POINT IV
ONE WHO CONVERTS PROPERTY OF
AN ESTATE IS A PROPER PARTY
IN INTEREST.
Point III of the petition for rehearing asks the Court to make a determination that the proper action for the
Administrator to take is against the stock
company which transfered the stock unlawfully rather than against the Appellant who
converted to her own use stock and proceeds
fromsale thereof in the name of her deceased
Father.
The representative of an estate under
Section 75-11-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, is entitled to bring an action
for the recovery of any property, real or
personal or to determine any adverse claim
thereon.
(See In Re Burt's Estate 58 Utah
353, 198 P. 1108.)
Under 75-11-6, the
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Administrator may maintain actions against
any person who has wasted, destroyed, taken
or carried away or converted to his own use,
the goods of the intestate. Under 75-11-18
any person suspected of having taken wrongful possession of any of the effects of the
decedent may be ordered into Court to account
for and deliver the same to the Administrator of the Estate.
(See In Re Estate
of Rice, 111 Utah 428, 182 P. 2(d) 111.)
The fact thaL there may be others,
including the Mercur Dorne Gold Mining Company, the transfer agent and the bonding
company who issued the bond to permit an
unlawful transfer of stock without probate,
constitutes such other parties purely to
be sureties, with the Appellant herein remaining the princip:i.l.
The right of the creditors (in this
case Administrator) to maintain an action
against the principle exists independently
of this rights as against the surety and
he may maintain an action against the
principal independently or against the
principal and the surety.
(See 72 C.J.S.
Principal and Surety, Section 245, Page
699, also 50 AM JUR Suretyship Section 172,
Page 1017.)
The remedies against both the
principle and surety are not inconsistent,
but are merely cumulative; both may be pursued at the same time until the Plaintiff's
damages are satisfied.
(See Monteplier vs.
National Surety Company,
97 Vermont 111,
122 A. 484, 33 ALR 389.)
The Case of
Yaffe vs. Bank of Chelsea, 271 P. 2(d)365,
-6-

held that the undertaking of a surety is
absolute and that he is directly liable
to the creditors, and the creditor may
sue either the
endorsor or
guarantor, or all of them at his option.
CONCLUSION
rhe basic dispute between the
Administrator of the Estate and the Appellant herein, was a factual one, involving
the question of whether there had been an
actual gift of stock, or whether there had
been actual involuntarily distribution of
the estates of an estate. The Trial Court
found in favor of the estate and ruled that
the evidence to the contrary was given by
the Appellant herein was barred by the
Dead Man's Statute. Under the remaining
evidence the proponderance was in favor
of the Respondent and that factual decision
should be upheld by the Appellate Court.
Respectfully submitted this 15th
day of March, 1973.
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